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ABSTRACT 
 
Numerous studies state that universal motorcycle helmet mandates are extremely effective in 
reducing motorcyclist fatalities and injuries. As a result, there have been two federal attempts to 
pass motorcycle helmet mandates, in 1966 and 1991; however, both of these mandates have 
since been repealed, even despite scientific evidence supporting their implementation. The 
purpose of this report therefore is to examine the main reasons for why universal motorcycle 
helmet mandates have not yet been passed in the U.S. Through textual analysis of  studies and 
news articles,  this report concludes that the values and objectives of motorcyclist associations, 
and the mobilized coalition that has resulted, are the main obstacles preventing regulators from 
passing universal helmet law. As a result, moving forward, regulators should continue promoting 
education among motorcyclists on the benefits of helmet-wearing, and as an altenative to helmet 
mandates, also encourage helmet use through implementing choice architecture. 
 
Keywords: motorcycle  helmet mandate, universal helmet law, motorcycle associations 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Motorcycle accidents are quite common− and sometimes fatal. According to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)− a federal agency under the Department of 
Transportation (DOT)−, in 2014 alone, 4586 motorcyclists were killed and 92,000 (2016). In 
other words, 1.15% of all registered motorcyclists were injured or killed in 2014 (Statista, 2016).  
A quick Google search of recent motorcycle accidents in the U.S. returned numerous news 
reports of accidents that occurred within the last 24 hours alone. On April 11 at 5:30PM, there 
were motorcycle accidents in Moore County, CO; Lebanon County, PA; Torrington, CT; 
McPherson, KS… the list goes on.  There are many reasons for these accidents: aggressive riding, 
lack of attention from drivers, dysfunctional machinery. Regardless of the cause, the resulting 
head injuries are a huge factor for what causes a motorcycle accident to become fatal. Many 
scientists have found that wearing helmets while riding is one way to prevent this.  Researchers 
at the NHTSA assert that helmet-wearing saved the lives of 1669 motorcyclists, reduced 
motorcycle fatalities by 27% in 2014 (NHTSA, 2016)1. However, not only is a motorcyclist’s 
life on the line when a motorcyclist is injured through a motorcycle accident – one that could 
have been prevented through wearing of a helmet – there are other personal, economic, and 
societal costs as well.  
 
To illustrate this point, on March 24th, 2016, a talented motorcyclist, Chris White died in an 
accident right outside his house. Though he suffered severe head injuries, he had no other 
injuries. His devastated mother lamented “he would still be here now if he had been wearing his 
helmet” (Scunthorpe, 2016). Only ten days before, on March 11th, two young twenty-year-old 
                                                     
1 This percent is calculated by using the 1669 motorcyclists saved by wearing a helmet divided by the total number 
of motorcyclists killed that year (4586+1669).  
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motorcyclists were killed in a collision with a semi-truck in Michigan. Neither of them was 
wearing helmets (Shalvey, 2016). Of course, their families are devastated by the tragedy. The 
woman, Brittany Simmons is survived by two young children, family and friends (Francis, 2016). 
Although not applicable to the two motorcyclists, if their injuries were less severe, there would 
have been exorbitant hospital expenses their families would have also burdened to carry. If 
White had public health insurance, then there would also be the additional societal burden of 
paying for his treatment. In 2014, a hospital study of 192 injured motorcyclists in Michigan 
calculated that medical expenses for injured helmetless riders was $11,400 or 53% higher than 
for helmeted riders (Chapman et al., 2014) 2. The NHTSA calculated that if every motorcyclist 
wore a helmet from 1984-1996, 3300 lives and $4.6B in medical expenses would have been 
saved (n.d. – “Universal”). Adding on other economic costs like lost productivity, legal and court 
costs, property damage, etc. would propel this cost even higher. 
 
Yet, despite this evidence, the U.S. government (at both the state and the federal level) is not 
able to simply pass a universal helmet mandate. Though the federal government has attempted to 
pass universal helmet law in the past, today the ability to pass a helmet law is under the 
jurisdiction of the state. Currently, according to the Highway Loss Data Institute, only 19 states 
have universal helmet laws. Some states have flip-flopped between a universal and partial law− 
partial law is when only certain categories of riders are mandated to wear motorcycle helmets; 
these usually include children and passengers but vary from state to state− while others have no 
helmet law in place at all.  Below, Figure 3 and Table 3 visualize the most recent state of helmet 
law, in 2016. 
                                                     
2 Other similar studies described by Roelofs (2014). 
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Figure 1: Map of what form of motorcycle law is present in each state, as of 2016 
 
Sourced from Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016.  
Table 1: Type of motorcycle helmet law present in each state, as of 2016 
 
Sourced from Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016.  
Type of Helmet Law States Number of States 
Universal 
Alabama, California, DC, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia 
20 
20 and younger Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas 8 
18 and younger Delaware 1 
17 and younger 
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado*, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
*Age limit includes passengers 
19 
No Law Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire 3 
Pa
rt
ia
l L
aw
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One reason for partial or no helmet laws rests in the conflicting values of individuals and those 
of the greater society. Individuals in the U.S. generally value their rights to have freedom of 
choice even in situations that poses serious consequences to others, whereas, societies are more 
concerned about the well-being of the greater good. This may not always be at odds with one 
another, but in the context of protective measures, cost-benefit analysis by the government can 
lead to restrictions of certain types of behaviours for the sake of protecting the society.  
Governments are not only concerned with motorcyclist safety, they also do not want motorcyclist 
families to face heartbreaking grief and higher medical expenses. To determine how regulators 
can be better positioned to prevent this devastation, this study will focus on determining why 
some states have been able to pass universal helmet law, and why others haven’t.  Specifically, 
this report will assess:  
Why has a universal motorcycle helmet law not been passed across the U.S., even with 
strong scientific evidence that supports such a measure? 
Although this report will be focusing on  mandating a motorcycle helmet law, it reflects on the 
theme of  requiring adoption of protective measures ranging from seatbelts to helmet mandates 
for sports despite conflicting values of individuals and the greater society. Determining the 
reasons why protective measures in the case of helmet mandates have not been implemented 
throughout the country, provides insight into why other protective measures have not been 
implemented.  
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BACKGROUND ON HELMET MANDATES 
 
Existing evidence of helmet mandate effectiveness 
First this report will begin by presenting scientific evidence demonstrating that helmet mandates 
are to (1) effectively reduce the risk of fatality and injury, and (2) tangibly increase the 
prevalence of helmet use on the road.  
 
Helmet Mandates Reduce Risk of Fatality and Injury 
Since Foldvary & Lane’s Australian report in 1964, study after study, from the U.S. and from 
abroad, have concluded that wearing helmets reduce the risk of fatalities. Hartunian, Smart, 
Willemain, & Zador (1983)  showed that the 28 states that weakened or repealed their helmet 
laws experienced an additional 516 unnecessary deaths in 1980. This was corroborated by 
Chenier & Evan’s report in 1987 who found that removing helmet laws in 48 U.S. states and DC 
was associated with an approximately 25% increase in fatalities. Even more recently Bavon & 
Standerfer reported in 2010 that immediately after Texas repealed its universal helmet law in 
1997, there was a sharp increase in fatalities and fatality rates.   
 
Though tempting for many states, partial helmet law is not a substitute for a universal mandate. 
The effects of partial helmet laws are comparable to no law at all. Changes in Texas’ helmet law 
can serve as an apt example. The Highway Data Loss Institute recorded, and updated in April 
2016, that Texas passed a universal helmet law in 1968. However, in 1977, it was replaced with 
a partial law where only those 17 years and younger were required to wear helmets.  Then in 
1989 a universal helmet law was reinstated, to be again replaced by a partial helmet law in 1997. 
This partial law stipulated that those 21 years and older, with a motorcyclist education or having 
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medical insurance, are exempt from wearing helmets.  Recently, in 2011, the partial law was 
modified so that only those 20 years and younger would to wear helmets. A study by Preusser, 
Hedlund, & Ulmer published in 2000 found that each time Texas’ universal law was replaced by 
a partial law in 1977 and again in 1997, motorcyclist fatalities increased. When the 1997 repeal 
occurred, there was a 31% increase in fatalities between the last full year the universal law was 
in place and the first full year following the repeal.  
 
Even among youth, partial helmet laws are not effective compared to universal mandates. 
Houston (2007) found that from 1975 to 2004, states’ universal laws were able to effectively 
reduce youth fatalities (youth being 15-20 year olds) by 30%, compared to states with no law. 
Meanwhile, there was no statistically significant difference between numbers of youth fatalities 
in states with partial law compared to states with no helmet law. Similar conclusions linking 
universal helmet law to reduced fatalities and injuries were found outside of the U.S. as well, for 
instance in Taiwan, Italy, Australia, Spain, and New Zealand3. 
 
Not only were fatalities reduced, but the number and severity of injuries also declined in states 
with universal helmet law as well. Coben, Steiner, & Miller (2007) found that in 2001, across 33 
states, states with universal law had 4.2% to 6.9% fewer motorcyclists than states with partial or 
no helmet law. In Washington State alone, Mock, Maier, Boyle, Pilcher, & Rivara (1994)’s study 
from 1986 to 1993 showed that there was a 40% reduction of hospitalized motorcyclist fatalities 
when universal helmet law was in place, compared to during the prior partial law. Dao et al. 
(2012) followed up on this finding in 2008 showing that across all 50 states, there was a 
                                                     
3 Refer to a full list of studies, Community Preventative Services Task Force (2016), “Supporting Materials”.  
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statistically significant 8.7% reduction in C-spine injuries when there was universal helmet law. 
The Highway Loss Data Institute released a bulletin in 2013 finding that in Michigan, following 
the state’s change from a universal to partial helmet law in April 2012, there was a 22% increase 
in medical claim severity for claims associated with cycle crashes. It seems clear that universal 
helmet mandates are able to reduce both the social cost of fatalities and the economic cost of 
medical expenses. The next section provides empirical evidence that helmet mandates increase 
motorcyclist helmet use and are thus responsible for reducing a motorcyclist’s risk of fatality or 
injury and hence reducing medical expenses that would otherwise be incurred.  
 
Helmet Mandates Increase Helmet Use 
Many studies have looked into the relationship between helmet mandates and reduced fatalities, 
and in general, they have found that this reduction in fatalities is because of an increase in helmet 
use. Auman, Kufera, Ballesteros, Smialek, & Dischinger (2002) found that from 1992 to 1993, 
helmet use in Maryland increased from 24.6% to 80.5% after the state amended its partial helmet 
law to a universal one. Meanwhile, Turner & Hagelin (2004) found that helmet use declined in 
Florida by 47%, even only after a year following a repeal of the state’s universal helmet law to a 
partial law in 2000 4. The NHTSA (1996) uses the 2012 National Occupant Protection Use 
Survey further supports these findings. Survey respondents, composed of motorcycle riders, 
indicated that they are not predisposed to voluntarily wearing motorcycle helmets (only 34-54% 
do). Thus, only if there was a helmet mandate forcing motorcyclists to wear helmets would they 
do so. Having universal helmet laws was able to significantly increase the percentage of 
motorcyclists on the road wearing helmets to 89% (as cited in NHTSA, 1996). 
 
                                                     
4 Data collected through observed motorcyclist helmet use.  
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In August 2013, the Community Prevent Services Task Force (Task Force) recommended that 
universal helmet mandates should be implemented for all riders, operators, and passengers5.  The 
Task Force is an “independent, nonfederal, unpaid panel of public health and prevention experts” 
appointed by Director of Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Its purpose is to 
provide recommendations based on evidence that can improve community health. One of their 
most recent charges was to conduct a thorough analysis of 71 studies that supported different 
aspects of the relationship between universal helmet mandates increase helmet use and the 
reduction in fatalities, injuries and the ensuing medical costs (2016, “Use of – Task Force”).  
After years of work combing through the effectiveness of helmet mandates, the Task Force 
found the following when states switched from universal to partial helmet law (2016, “Use of – 
Task Force”): 
1) Helmet use decreased by a median of 41 percentage points 
2) Total deaths decreased by a median of 42% 
3) Fatality rates increased by medians of 34% per registered motorcycle, 23% per vehicle 
mile traveled, and 23% per crash 
4) Total number of non-fatal injuries increased by a median of 41%, with non-fatal injuries 
having a median increase of 74% 
The Task Force concluded in subsequent presentations that not only would helmet mandates 
reduce the risk of injury and fatality, but would also “produce substantial economic benefits” 
(American Motorcyclist Association [AMA], 2013). At the time when these recommendations 
were made public, motorcycle associations loudly vocalized their dissent to an expected attempt 
                                                     
5 Addressed through numerous platforms, Community Preventive Services Task Force (2014) (2016, “Use of – Task 
Force”).  
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for the Task Force and CDC to urge the adoption of a universal helmet mandate. However, 
nearly three years later, there still has been little movement towards such a mandate.  
Legislative History of U.S. Helmet Mandates 
History has demonstrated that helmet mandates have been a source of disagreement Universal 
mandates have been implemented, and then repealed. Partial mandates have been implemented, 
repealed, and implemented again. This section will briefly describe the history of federal 
motorcycle helmet mandates in the U.S. – from their implementation to their repeal – as well as 
future potential re-enactments of a federal helmet mandate. Understanding what helmet mandates 
have been passed in the past can help us better understand what the scope for feasible helmet 
mandates are and what factors influence whether they are continued or repealed.  
 
The National Highway Safety Act of 1966 
The government initially paid very little attention to motorcycle safety. Though motorcycles 
were commercially available in the early 1900s, their motorcycle use only skyrocketed in the 
1940s when it became a recreational sport. The Motorcycle Safety Foundation reported that by 
1945, 198,000 motorcycles were registered in the U.S., and within 20 years, this number 
skyrocketed to 1.4 million (n.d.). As motorcycle popularity continued to rise the number of 
motor vehicle fatalities increased as well. The NHTSA’s historical records on motor vehicle 
traffic fatalities and fatality rates, and as illustrated in Figure 1, reveals that the 37,965 fatalities 
in 1956 had surpassed the peak of 38,142 in 1941 (as cited in “Motorcycle Vehicle Traffic,” 
2004). Nevertheless, perhaps because the fatality rate was declining steadily to only 5 deaths per 
million vehicle miles travelled (VMT) − down from a high of 15 deaths per million VMT in 
 
Page | 13  
  
1930−, the government still did not attempt to make driving vehicles or riding motorcycles safer6 
(“Motorcycle Vehicle Traffic,” 2004). The safety of motorcyclists continued to rest in the hands 
of the manufacturers.  
Figure 2: Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities & Fatality Rate from 1930 – 1965 
 
Sourced from “Motorcycle Vehicle Traffic, 2004.  
 
It was only in the mid-1960s, when two high profile texts− “Unsafe at Any Speed” by Ralph 
Nader and “Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society” by the 
National Academy of Sciences− were published, that public pressure triggered Congress to 
address motor vehicle safety issues by hosting publicized meetings (United States, 1966). 
Enacting of the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act and the National Highway Safety Act soon 
followed in 1966. These Acts allowed the federal government to define and regulate standards 
                                                     
6 There is no historical record of motorcycle fatalities and fatality rates in the early 1900s. However, this report will 
assume that since the government had not yet implemented safety mandates for any personal ground transportation, 
fatality and fatality rate trends for motorcycles are relatively similar. 
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for motor vehicles and highways respectively in an effort to increase safety on the roads and 
reduce all forms of motor vehicle fatalities (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 2001). In 
relation to motorcycle safety, the 1966 Highway Safety Act linked the distribution of federal 
highway funds to the existence of state motorcycle helmet laws. The Secretary of Transportation 
had the power to set uniform standards for state highway safety programs and, as an economic 
incentive, withheld federal highway funds from states without laws mandating riders to wear 
helmets (Houston & Richardson, 2007; Ulmer & Preusser, 2003). 
 
The agency created to carry out the safety programs outlined in the 1966 Safety Acts, the 
NHTSA, believed helmets were an integral part of motorcycle safety (n.d. – “Who”). Although 
motorcycle helmets had not been mandated in any state at this point, there was already 
considerable research on and international support for the benefits of motorcycle helmets.  
 
Interest in this topic was inspired on May 19th, 1935, when T. E. Lawrence, otherwise known as 
Lawrence of Arabia, died after being critically injured in a fatal motorcycle accident (“1935,” 
n.d.). Moved by this respected man’s tragic death, Dr. Hugh Cairns, a neurosurgeon attending 
him, spent the rest of his life studying head injuries from motorcycle accidents. His research 
eventually led to the development of a motorcycle crash helmet in 1941. Dr. Cairns believed all 
motorcyclists, whether civilian or military, should adopt his helmet, as it protects riders from 
head and neck injuries− the two major causes of fatalities sustained in the event of a motorcycle 
accident 7  (Maartens, Wills, & Adams, 2002). The first patent for motorcycle helmets was 
submitted 12 years later in 1953 by Professor C.F. “Red” Lombard (McIntyre, 2013). While the 
                                                     
7 Since motorcycle helmets aim to protect riders from head and neck injuries− the two major causes of fatalities 
sustained in the event of a motorcycle accident− helmets can reduce the likelihood of death or serious injury. 
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U.S. federal government addressed few motorcycle safety concerns in the 1950s, smaller 
organizations like the Snell Memorial Foundation and the California Highway Patrol, still 
implemented their own helmet safety standards (“Evolution of Motorcycle,” n.d.). 
 
In 1961, according to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety [IIHS], Australia enacted the 
world’s first motorcycle helmet law (2008) which is still in effect today. Most other countries 
followed suit.  According to the World Health Organization (2010), 172 countries out of the 177 
that had data on road traffic deaths by type of road users have helmet law that requires 
motorcyclist drivers to wear helmets. Dominica, Fiji, Kiribati, Liberia, and the U.S. are the only 
countries without such a mandate. 
 
Repeal of the 1966 Highway Safety Act 
The economic incentive for states to mandate universal motorcycle helmet laws was initially 
extremely effective. According to the Highway Loss Data Institute (2016), 36 states complied by 
the end of 1968 (see Table 2). In 1969 and the early 1970s, the other states gradually decided to 
mandate helmet laws as well. By the end of 1975, all states, except for three (California, Illinois, 
and Utah) had enacted universal motorcycle helmets laws. However, this success was short-lived. 
According to Jones & Bayer, in 1975, when the Secretary of Transportation was preparing to 
withhold a portion of non-complying states’ highway construction funds− in other words, 
penalize the three states listed above for still not having mandated motorcycle helmet laws− 
motorcyclist associations opposing the mandate mounted an attack on the NHTSA. They 
attempted to discredit the NHTSA’s claims, declaring that the NHTSA manipulated data, and 
that helmets actually increase the prevalence of neck injuries. More importantly, they proclaimed 
that (1) this mandate infringed on a motorcyclist’s right to choice, and (2) it violated the 
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Fourteenth Amendment. This argument was surprisingly accepted by the Illinois Supreme Court 
and the Michigan Appeals Court.  
 
In Illinois, People vs. Fries, this ruling rested on the Supreme Court’s specification that the 
purpose of the helmet mandate would be to “safeguard the person wearing it,” to solely protect 
the motorcyclist. Because the safeguarding of a person is “essentially a matter of personal safety,” 
the Supreme Court reasons that in terms of headgear protection (and more specifically helmet 
use), “the legislature may not, of course, under the guise of protecting the public interest, 
interfere with private rights” (as cited by Jones & Bayer, 2007). Meanwhile, in Michigan’s 
American Motorcycle Association v. Department of State Police in 1968, the reasoning was as 
follows. Although the state had an interest in passing legislation that kept citizens “healthy and 
self-supporting,” the Appeals Court believed that this logic was not applicable as it could lead to 
“unlimited paternalism.” The Appeals Court also reasoned that though state has an interest in 
highway safety, this interest was not a legitimate claim for implementing helmet law since “it 
would also justify a requirement that automobile drivers wear helmets or buckle their seat belts 
for their own protection” (as cited by Jones & Bayer, 2007). 
 
However, the rulings of the Illinois Supreme Court and the Michigan Appeals Court were 
anomalies. The Massachusetts District Court ruled in 1972, Simon v. Sargent, completely 
contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court. The District Court concluded with the following:  
“For while we agree with plaintiff that the act’s only realistic purpose is the prevention of 
head injuries incurred in motorcycle mishaps, we cannot agree that the consequences of 
such injuries are limited to the individual who sustains the injury. In view of the evidence 
warranting a finding that motorcyclists are especially prone to serious head injuries . . . 
the public has an interest in minimizing the resources directly involved. From the 
moment of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a 
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municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment 
compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes 
permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family’s continued 
subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to think that only 
he himself is concerned.” (Simon v. Sargent).  
 
In other states where the legitimacy of helmet mandates was brought to the states’ high court− 
mainly for federal constitutional grounds− the challenge against helmet mandates was rejected. 
And yet, amidst mounting opposition from motorcyclist associations against a federal, universal 
helmet mandate, in December 1975, the Senate introduced and approved a bill to revise the 1966 
Highway Safety Act, removing the financial link between highway funds and mandated helmet 
law (Jones & Bayer, 2007). 
 
Despite evidence from the Highway Loss Data Institute (2016) indicating that motorcycle 
helmets reduce injuries and fatalities, many states began to repeal their universal helmet laws− 
either completely or to a partial version of the law− immediately after the 1966 Highway Safety 
Act was amended. That year, in 1975, the number of states with universal law dropped from 47 
to 39 (see specifics in Table 2).   
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Table 2: Timeline of states enacting and/or repealing universal, partial, and no helmet law, 
from 1966 onwards (U = universal, P = partial, N = no helmet law) 
 
State 
1966-1975: 
Highway Safety 
Act – Enacted 
1976-1990: 
Highway 
Safety Act − 
Repealed 
1991-1993: 
ISTEA 
– Enacted 
1994: ISTEA 
– Repealed 
Current 
Law 
Alabama [U]: Nov-1967    Universal 
Alaska [U]: Jan-1971 [P]: Jun-1976   Partial 
Arizona [U]: Jan-1969 [P]: May-1976   Partial 
Arkansas [U]: Jun-1967   [P]: Jan-1997 Partial 
California  [U]: Jan-1985 [U]:Jan-1992  Universal 
Colorado [U]: Jul-1969 [N]: May-1977  [P]: Jul-2007 Partial 
Connecticut [U]: Oct-1967 
[N]: Jun-1976 
[P]: Jan-1990 
  Partial 
District of 
Columbia 
[U]: Feb-1970    Universal 
Delaware [U]: Jun-1968 [P]: Jun-1978   Partial 
Florida [U]: Sep-1967   
[P]: Jul-2000 
[P]: Nov-2011 Partial 
Georgia [U]: Jul-1969    Universal 
Hawaii [U]: Jun-1967 [P]: Jun-1977   Partial 
Idaho [U]: Jan-1968 [P]: Mar-1978   Partial 
Illinois 
[U]: Jul-1969 
[N]: Jul-1970    None 
Indiana [U]: Jul-1967 
[N]: Aug-1977 
[P]: Jan-1984 
  Partial 
Iowa [U]: Sep-1975 [N]: Jul-1976   None 
Kansas 
[U]: Jul-1967 
[P]: Jul-1970 
[U]: Jul-1972 
[P]: Jul-1976 
[P]: Jul-1979 
  Partial 
Kentucky [U]: Jun-1968   [P]: Jul-1998 Partial 
Louisiana [U]: Jul-1968 
[P]: Oct-1976 
[U]: Jan-1982  
[P]: Aug-1999 
[U]: Aug-2004 Universal 
Maine [U]: Oct-1967 
[N]: Oct-1977 
[P]: Jul-1980 
 [P]: Sep-2009 Partial 
Maryland [U]: Jun-1968 
[N]: Jul-1968 
[P]: Jul-1979 
 [U]: Oct-1992 Universal 
Massachusetts [U]: May-1967    Universal 
Michigan 
[U]: Mar-1967 
[N]: Jun-1968 
[U]: Jul-1969 
  [P]: Apr-2012 Partial 
Minnesota [U]: May-1968 [P]: Apr-1977   Partial 
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Mississippi [U]: Mar-1974    Universal 
Missouri [U]: Sep-1967    Universal 
Montana [U]: Jul-1973 [P]: Jul-1977   Partial 
Nebraska [U]: May-1967 
[N]: Sep-1977 
[U]: Jan-1989 
  Universal 
Nevada [U]: Jan-1972    Universal 
New Hampshire [U]: Sep-1967 [P]: Aug-1977  [N] Sep-1995 None 
New Jersey [U]: Jan-1968    Universal 
New Mexico [U]: Jun-1967 [P]: Mar-1978   Partial 
New York [U]: Jan-1967    Universal 
North Carolina [U]: Jan-1968    Universal 
North Dakota [U]: Jul-1967 [P]: Jul-1977   Partial 
Ohio [U]: Jan-1968 [P]: Jul-1978   Partial 
Oklahoma 
[U]: Apr-1967 
[P]: Jan-1969 
[U]: 1975 
[P]: May-1976   Partial 
Oregon [U]: Jan-1968 
[P]: Oct-1977 
[U]: Jun-1988 
  Universal 
Pennsylvania [U]: Jul-1968   [P]: Sep-2003 Partial 
Rhode Island [U]: Apr-1967 [P]: May-1976 [P]: Jul-1992  Partial 
South Carolina [U]: Jul-1967 [P]: Jun-1980   Partial 
South Dakota [U]: Jul-1967 [P]: Jul-1977   Partial 
Tennessee [U]: Jun-1967    Universal 
Texas [U]: Jan-1968 
[P]: Aug-1977 
[U]: Sep-1989  [P]: Sep-1997 Partial 
Utah [U]: May-1969 [P]: May-1977   Partial 
Vermont [U]: Mar-1968    Universal 
Virginia [U]: Jun-1970    Universal 
Washington [U]: Jun-1967 
[N]: Sep-1977 
[P]: Jul-1987 
[U]: Jun-1990 
  Universal 
West Virginia [U]: May-1971    Universal 
Wisconsin [U]: Jul-1968 [P]: Mar-1978   Partial 
Wyoming [U]: May-1973 [P]: May-1983 [P]: Jul-1993  Partial 
 
Sourced from Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016.  
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The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 
The latter half of the 1970s therefore inadvertently became a grand public health experiment. 
The states with universal helmet law were the control, while states that repealed the law were the 
experimental group. After a few years of observation− with 26 states having either repealed their 
laws entirely or adopted a partial law− in 1978, the NHTSA reported that repeals were a “major 
factor” leading to the 23% higher number of deaths in 1977 than in 1976, even with only a 1% 
increase of motorcycle registrations in the same period (as cited in Peterson, 1978)8. In light of 
this evidence and to curb this troubling rise in fatalities, that very same year, the head of the 
NHTSA, Joan Claybrook wrote to state governors who had repealed their laws and urged them to 
reinstate a universal law once again. Citing the safety risks released in the NHTSA. She even 
attempted to draw public eye to the issue by stating “Motorcycle deaths in 1977 were up 24% 
over 1976… [with] one important element of this increase [being the] decline in helmet use” in 
the New York Times the year after (as cited in Hoseldolph, 1979).  
 
However, Claybrook’s appeal went unacknowledged, and states continued to repeal their 
universal helmet laws. In the 1980s, evidence continued to grow, overwhelmingly supporting the 
view that helmets reduced not only individual safety risks, but also had the potential to reduce 
societal costs, namely in the form of emergency healthcare for seriously injured, helmetless 
riders. Numerous reports, some of which were described previously in this report, consistently 
came to the same findings: that fatality rates and medical costs increased following repeals of 
universal helmet law. Even researchers abroad came to the same conclusion. A study in Italy 
determined that there was an overall decrease in head injuries and fatalities, and a 30% reduction 
                                                     
8 It is unclear if the increase in motorcyclist deaths occurred specifically in states that had repealed their universal 
helmet laws. 
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in motorcycle accidents when helmets were mandated (Nurchi, Golino, Floris, Meleddu, & 
Coraddu, 1986). And yet the NHTSA and the federal government continued to do nothing. 
Physicians, epidemiologists, and public health officials became increasingly more frustrated. 
 
It was only in May 1989, when the federal government was also attempting to mandate states to 
have seatbelt laws that the issue of motorcyclists wearing helmets was again brought to the table. 
Senator John Chafee introduced a bill similar to the 1966 Highway Safety Act. If states did not 
mandate universal helmet laws and seatbelt laws, the Secretary of Transportation would have the 
authority to withhold up to 10%9 of the states’ federal highway funds (National Highway Fatality 
and Injury Reduction Act of 1989; Jones & Bayer, 2007). Though the Senator and his supporters 
spent some time addressing the argument for government to be antipaternalistic, comparing 
mandatory helmet laws to compulsory immunization for the health of the greater public, again, 
the crux of their argument rested heavily on the scientifically proven benefits of wearing (and 
mandating) helmets, and the disastrous consequences of not doing so (Jones & Bayer, 2007). The 
staggering amount of indisputable evidence, much more than had been available in 1966, 
managed to trump the opposition of motorcyclist associations. The resulting National Highway 
Fatality and Injury Reduction Act of 1989 was thus included as an amendment, in Sec. 1031(b) 
to the much larger bill being structured at the time:  the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) an Act that would change the way transportation planning and 
policymaking would be carried out and defined (H. R. Rep. 2950, 1991).  
 
                                                     
9 Hess, from the Houston Chronicle, reported in 1995 that this 10% was eventually reduced to 3% when the bill was 
officially passed (as cited in Jones & Bayer, 2007). 
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Following the passage of the 1991 ISTEA, California− most notably the state that had never 
passed a universal helmet law− revised their existing partial law to become a universal law in 
1992− and has maintained it ever since (Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016). However, 
California was the exception. Although the 1991 ISTEA was extremely similar to its sister, the 
1966 Highway Safety Act, this time, states were not compelled to enact universal laws as they 
had before.  
 
Repeal of the ISTEA 
However, within a few short years, soon after the Republicans took control of Congress in 1994, 
the American Motorcyclist Association’s national motorcycle lobby managed to convince the 
federal government to repeal the ISTEA10 (Jones & Bayer, 2007). No states had been fined prior 
to the repeal. This repeal led to another wave of states discarding their universal helmet laws, 
though some states decided to address the social burden of accidents by having partial laws that  
allowed motorcyclists to ride without helmets only if they held medical insurance (Highway 
Loss Data Institute, 2015). Yet even such partial law amendments are still only a patchwork 
solution. In Tennessee, during discussions on whether to repeal the state’s universal helmet law 
and replace it with the partial law described above, opponents of the partial law argued that it 
would be extremely difficult for enforcement officials to determine, on the street, who has proper 
medical coverage and who does (Associated Press, 2016).   
 
                                                     
10 It’s worthwhile to note that despite the fact that though the more conservative Republicans would seem more 
likely be opposed to helmet laws, the likelihood of a state to be red or blue does not play any role in predicting 
which states do or do not have universal helmet law.  For instance, Alabama, a staunchly Republican state has 
maintained its universal helmet law since 1967, whereas California, known as a much more liberal Democratic state, 
only passed a partial helmet law in 1985 and universal helmet law in 1992.  
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Currently only 19 states and the District of Columbia have universal helmet law. These states are 
the following: 
 
Overall, Figure 3 illustrates that the enactment of federal helmet law marked the two major time 
periods where changes in helmet law occurred. First is between 1967 and 1975− when the 1966 
Highway Safety Act was in place− where nearly all states adopted a universal law. Prior to this 
law, most of these states didn’t have a helmet law whatsoever. The second point is the period 
between 1975 and 1991. Here, when there was no federal helmet mandate or penalty, more and 
more states began to repeal their universal laws and replace them with partial helmet laws. Third, 
for a few years after 1991, when Intermodal STEA was implemented, a few states adopted 
universal helmet law, much fewer than in the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Finally, after the 
ISTEA penalties were removed, more states decided to repeal their universal helmet law. Overall, 
federal mandates do seem to have some influence over whether states will implement universal 
helmet law or not. In addition, most states repealing their universal laws have opted to adopt 
partial helmet laws instead, with the number of states having partial helmet law now surpassing 
that of universal helmet law.  
 
  
Alabama, California, DC, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia 
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Figure 3: Number of states with universal, partial, and no motorcycle helmet law from 
1967 - 2007 
 
Sourced from Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016.  
 
Thus far, the federal government has failed, twice, to incentivize states to adopt universal helmet 
laws. Though persuasive in theory, by restricting a portion of federal highway funding with the 
Highway Safety Act of 1966 and again with the 1991 ISTEA, it is clear that states do not take 
kindly to penalties. Yet, even with these consequences, the federal government may still attempt 
to mandate states to enact a universal motorcycle helmet law, following the recommendation of 
the Community Task Force that the U.S. should implement universal helmet laws (“Use of – 
Task Force,” 2016).  What are the obstacles that prevent states from mandating universal helmet 
law? The next section addresses this question.  
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A HYPOTHESIZED STRATEGY FOR  
IMPLEMENTING HELMET LAWS 
 
 
To assess why universal motorcycle helmet law has not been passed in the U.S., this report will 
examine the values and objectives of the two most involved parties: the regulators and the 
motorcycle associations. This is not to say that there are no other stakeholders in this issue; 
medical associations, insurance companies, motorcyclists themselves, all have varying degrees 
of interest in the implementation of motorcycle helmet law. However, historically, they have not 
had much influence on the outcome of helmet mandates in the U.S., and so will not be addressed 
here.  
 
Motorcycle associations are large organizations (often non-profit), that generally represent the 
beliefs and desires of individual motorcyclists. Because of their sheer size, associations can 
magnify the voices of motorcyclist individuals and ensure that their opinions are heard by the 
regulators and constituencies that have the power to drive change. However, not all motorcyclists 
subscribe to the beliefs and goals of motorcycle associations. Sometimes, individual 
motorcyclists may hold beliefs that are completely contradictory to the position of motorcyclist 
associations but for simplicity, I will focus on the position of the motorcyclist associations and 
assume they reflect the individual beliefs of the motorcyclists 
 
Scientific evidence and research since the 1930s very clearly supports a well-enforced helmet 
requirement significantly reduce a motorcyclist’s risk of injury or death when in an accident and 
the ensuing hospital costs for those who are not killed. Yet motorcyclist associations and some 
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regulators still strongly oppose motorcycle helmet mandates, with this opposition leading to the 
repeal of existing universal helmet mandates in 31 states.    
 
I hypothesize that universal helmet mandates have not been passed because of a combination of 
internal and external factors. First, supporting helmet mandates often ran counter to the 
regulators’ and motorcycle associations’ internal values and objectives. Second, motorcycle 
associations restructured their external environment and took three vital steps:  
(1) They redefined their goals and developed a strategy for repealing the helmet law  
(2) They partnered and collaborated with other motorcycle-interest organizations, like the 
AMA, NCOM, MRF, and various SMROs 
(3) They built strong relationships with regulators and political representatives 
Together, these three steps enabled freedom of choice to be a compelling argument for why 
helmet laws should not be implemented.  
 
Regulators can avoid being swayed by motorcyclist associations and encourage riders to wear 
helmets by: 
(1) Actively educating motorcyclists and motorcycle associations on the public benefits of 
helmet laws. 
(2) Implementing choice architecture to encourage motorcyclists to wear helmets on the road. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Analyzing the Nature of the Decision Making Process 
Numerous studies have made it abundantly clear that scientifically, helmet-wearing provides 
immeasurable benefits (both to the individual and to society). Therefore, this report will analyze 
the reasons for opposition to helmet mandates in two parts. 
 
First, this report will gain a better understanding of the regulators and the motorcyclist 
associations by interpreting stated missions and intentions of these parties to explore their 
internal decision-making processes, specifically each side’s values, objectives, systems of 
thinking, and biases. Identifying these roots can elucidate where each parties’ stances stem from. 
Afterwards, keeping these roots in mind, this report will determine and analyze external 
structural and environmental influences behind the push-and-pull interactions that these two 
parties have with each other by combing through transcripts of and press releases following 
helmet law enactments and repeals. These influences are what may hold the key to why universal 
motorcycle helmet law has not yet been successfully passed in the U.S.  
 
Values and Objectives 
One’s internal decision-making processes are what drive all our beliefs, perceptions, actions and 
behaviours. The most notable cogs motivating this process are one’s values and objectives, 
systems of thinking and biases. According to Oxford Dictionaries, values can be defined as one’s 
“principles or standards of behavior; one’s judgment of what is important in life.” Others have 
defined them slightly differently as “general guidelines for social conduct” (Mondal, n.d.). 
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Regardless, they differ from group to group, person to person. Meanwhile, objectives are the 
goals one wants to reach because of one’s values. Values are the guiding rules that shape one’s 
objectives, prime one’s response to environmental stimuli, and then with this frame of mind, 
consequentially respond accordingly. For instance, one could value hard work (or industry), as 
Benjamin Franklin famously did, driving his objective to always be doing something productive 
(Franklin, 1909). What are the values and objectives that drive regulators or motorcycle 
associations? And in what ways do they potentially contradict with mandating universal helmet 
law? 
 
Regulators   Theoretically, regulators, as public servants, should value the well-being 
of the communities they represent and strive to achieve that end. The Treasury Board of Canada 
has a page on the “Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector” which revolve around five 
values: respect for democracy, respect for people, integrity, stewardship, and excellence (2011). 
Meanwhile, the Public Sector Commission of Western Australia also details its code of ethics or 
values:  personal integrity, relationships with others, and accountability (Public Sector 
Commission, 2012). There is no such explicit code in the U.S. Yet, the White House has 
included in a statement that U.S. regulators have the “moral responsibility” to create “a better 
world” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). In other words, regulators should also hold similar 
values as that of Canada and Western Australia; everything they do must reflect the core 
principle of protecting the people and their well-being. This is represented by the Oath of Office 
required at the start of Congress for all members of the U.S. Senate (excluding those that have 
already been sworn in) and the House of Representatives. They must “solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign 
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and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same” (United States Senate, n.d.). 
With the Constitution itself created to ensure that the U.S. government would be “just” and 
“protect its citizens” from internal and external conflicts. Therefore, as representatives of the 
people who have sworn to uphold the Constitution, it follows that U.S. regulators value their 
responsibility to justly protecting their people. 
 
Yet, realistically, many regulators have personal values that may supersede that imposed by the 
expectations of the government. For instance, they could also value their own continuity in their 
role of authority and power. To maintain this, the objective of regulators may thus become about 
satisfying certain constituencies and special interest groups− especially appeasing those that 
shout the loudest− even though their issues may neither result in greater public good nor are they 
ones that the general public care particularly about. Here, this would be translated to repealing a 
universal helmet law just because various motorcyclist associations strongly voices that it should 
be repealed. The groups that shout the loudest often drown out the voices of smaller less 
organized constituencies. They have the finances to influence regulators even from the inside – 
through lobbying and other political avenues. Ultimately, some regulators may be part of the 
process encouraging repeals of helmet laws rather than attempting to implement them. The 
influence of lobbying and collective action will be addressed further in the report.  
 
Motorcyclist Associations There are many motorcyclist associations in the U.S., for 
instance the National Coalition of Motorcyclists (NCOM), the Motorcycle Riders Foundation 
(MRF), and the largest of these associations, the American Motorcyclist Association (AMA). 
There are also state motorcyclists’ rights organizations (SMROs) in over 30 states; they are often 
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associated with the non-profit Alliance of Bikers Aimed Toward Education (ABATE). However, 
though they all have slightly different missions, all of these motorcyclist associations highly 
value and advocate for the rights of motorcyclists. The MRF states that they strive to “continue 
developing an aggressive, independent national advocate for the advancement of motorcycling 
and its associated lifestyle” (2016). Similarly, the AMA states that their purpose is to “promote 
the motorcycle lifestyle and protect the future of motorcycling” (“AMA Mission,” 2013). As a 
whole it is clear that their main interest lie in maintaining and advocating for motorcyclist rights.  
 
These values are especially present in relation to the wearing of helmets and helmet mandates. 
Specifically, the AMA believes that “adults should have the right to voluntarily decide when to 
wear a helmet… adults are capable of making personal safety decisions for themselves” (“AMA 
Position, 2013). This is in line with their general perception that “opponents of motorcycling are 
hard at work trying to take away our freedoms.” (AMA, “Membership,” 2013). The AMA 
concedes that increased awareness for motorcycle safety is imperative, yet they and others still 
question the validity of evidence presented by scientists that wearing helmets reduces the 
likelihood of death or injury in a motorcycle accident. Even if it were proven to be safer to wear 
helmets, the AMA claims that riders still want the freedom to be able to make that choice. The 
resulting objective for the AMA and other motorcyclist associations is thus to oppose any action 
that restricts this freedom, to prevent or repeal already existing helmet mandates. If their 
members wear helmets, they want it to be because they freely chose to and not because it was 
forced upon them by regulators.  
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Clearly, regulators and motorcycle associations do not align along the same values, and thus 
have very different objectives. Regulators value serving the greater good; yet this can conflict 
with their individual value to maintain continuity. Meanwhile, motorcycle associations value 
freedom of choice, which is much more individualistic. This misalignment in values can help 
explain why scientific evidence showing the effectiveness of helmet mandates do not lead to any 
urgency for helmet mandate implementation.  
 
Thinking  Via Systems 1 and 2 
In addition to ones values and objectives, one’s use of different systems of thinking also 
influences one’s decision-making. Kahneman (2002) categorized human thought-processes into 
two systems: System 1 or intuitive thinking, and System 2 or deliberative thinking based on 50 
years of research by psychologists. Intuitive thinking is characterized as quick, involuntary, and 
automatic, while deliberative thinking is slower, conscious, and more effortful (Kahneman, 
2014). Intuitive thinking allows us to expend less time and attention to collecting and processing 
information but at the cost of mental shortcuts, systematic biases, and simplified decision rules. 
The reason intuitive thinking works so quickly is because signals are channeled through existing 
neural pathways or schemas− in psychology, defined as a cognitive framework or concept, 
unique to each individual, that helps one organize and interpret information− rather than being 
processed as a unique signal in its own right (DiMaggio, 1997. This will be explored by 
examining the differing responses of regulators and motorcyclist associations to the death of a 15 
year old motorcyclist in California in 1973.  
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Regulators Following the death, a Burbank councilman proposed a mandatory helmet 
law in California. For this regulator, the death of this youth immediately triggered the need to 
have increased protection for individuals on the road, which in turn led to the thought that 
helmets must be worn and that it is the regulators’ job to ensure that this is the case. This near-
automatic link between a motorcyclist death and the need to wear helmets is an intuitive form of 
thinking. It is a link that has been impressed upon individuals since they were young, that 
wearing helmets protects against injuries. Thus the regulator’ response is one that can be 
understood. However, if there are also many other ways that regulators could have responded 
more deliberatively.  
 
Motorcycle Associations Meanwhile, in contrast, the motorcycle associations 
responded to the death more ambivalently. However, when they heard of the regulators’ proposal 
to implement a helmet mandate, they immediately, intuitively jumped to the conclusion that 
regulators are doing so because they he right of motorcyclists to freedom of choice.  Of course, 
there are definitely more nuances behind the intent of the regulators to mandate helmet use, for 
instance, the desire to reduce the likelihood of future youth deaths, the believe that protecting the 
public is more important than one’s individual freedoms etc. Ultimately the motorcycle 
associations were able to successfully lobby against the mandate, and the helmet law failed.  
 
Biases of Regulators and Motorcyclist Associations 
When it comes to whether there should be a motorcycle helmet mandate or not, intuitive thinking 
and its accompanying biases can influence different parties to act in certain ways. These 
behaviours can then be unconsciously used to support already existing values and objectives. 
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They may drive the strong opinions criticizing the implementation of helmet mandates. Below is 
a list of biases and decision rules that seem to apply to regulators and motorcyclist association 
and inferred from reading numerous articles and press releases about them and their behaviour 
(Table  3). 
  
Table 3: Biases corresponding to regulators and/or motorcycle associations 
Bias / Decision Rule Definition Regulators Associations 
Survivorship Concentrating on individuals who have 
“survived” and overlooking those who 
haven’t 
 X 
Availability Relying on immediate examples to 
estimate the frequency of an occurrence 
X  
Optimism Believe “it won’t happen to me”  X 
Consistency  Reliability and uniformity of successive 
results 
X  
 
Survivorship – Motorcycle Associations  
Motorcyclist associations, who through intuitive thinking immediately jump into opposing a 
helmet mandate, can rationalize the gap between their position and scientific evidence by 
believing that the likelihood of an accident doesn’t reflect the probabilities of its members; there 
is a greater focus on individuals who have “survived” and overlooking those who haven’t, 
otherwise called a survivorship bias (Shermer, 2014). For instance, the AMA staunchly supports 
education when it comes to a solution for reducing motorcycle injuries on the road. However, 
this belief can imply that if only everyone was a competently skilled, educated motorcyclist, 
accidents on the road would not occur. The reason for this thinking is that motorcyclists’ minds 
can self-select the accidents they want to remember. Thinking about themselves, they can 
rationalize to themselves that they have not gotten into an accident yet because they know how to 
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properly navigate a motorcycle on the road. Yet, when thinking through this veil of survivorship 
bias, the motorcyclists conveniently “forget” the other accidents with equally competent 
motorcyclists that were out of the riders’ control. Competency equates to a much lower risk of 
getting into an accident than truly is the case. 
 
 Availability Bias − Regulators 
Regulators, who through intuitive thinking want to satisfy their constituencies, can rationalize to 
themselves that the number of motorcyclist accidents occurring each year is dwarfed by the 
much larger number of vehicular accidents a year (Highway Loss Data Institute, 2016). Thus 
some regulators may believe that it does not make much difference if helmets are not mandated. 
In fact, as mentioned previously, motorcycle accidents happen all the time; the media just does 
not cover them and they do not become front-page news. The lack of prominent headlines and 
the corresponding belief that there are not very many motorcycle accidents would be an 
availability bias− when individuals rely on related, immediate examples to estimate the 
frequency of an occurrence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). By using media coverage as a metric 
for the frequency of motorcycle accidents, and essentially succumbing to the availability bias, 
regulators have a reduced sense of urgency to take action, and thus the passing of helmet 
mandates is not the top priority 
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Optimism Bias – Motorcycle Associations 
Motorcycle association members fall prey to the optimism bias, or won’t-happen-to-me bias− 
although they recognize that the probability of being involved in an accident is relatively high, 
they often believe that this is only applicable to other motorcyclists, not them. The IDAHO 
STAR Program, which trains motorcyclists with skills for how to behave on the road, released a 
statement that pointed out that the motorcyclists they have seen often succumb to the optimism 
bias. Following devastating accidents, motorcyclists have a tendency to comment saying that 
“Well, the rider was…” or “That rider should have/shouldn’t have…” This attitude may seem 
dismissive or attribute unnecessarily blame on the riders, however, it could also be a defense 
mechanism for how motorcyclists cope with the fact that their hobby is so dangerous. IDAHO 
STAR contends that all motorcyclists “know – deep down− that riding a motorcycle carries a 
much higher risk of injury and death than driving a car,” and yet, the motorcyclists tend to 
believe that the accidents won’t happen to them.  
 
 Consistency – Regulators 
As mentioned briefly before, to maintain their public image, regulators tend to remain 
consistent− reliable and uniform− in their beliefs and values, thus meaning that they will 
continue to either support helmet mandates or not; there is very little change once an opinion 
about helmet mandates has been formed. For instance, in the 2008 Iowa Senate election, ABATE 
Iowa surveyed whether senator candidates supported helmet mandates or not. The opposition 
responses were recorded verbatim. Many who opposed said things along the lines of “Very 
simple – oppose, as I have in the past,” “We have repealed the helmet law once – I will vote 
against reinstating it!” (ABATE Iowa, 2008). Their references to previous actions infer that they 
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believe consistency is important, both to themselves and to the eyes of the public. However, it is 
important to note that consistency can also work for helmet mandate supporters as well. Those 
that have supported helmet mandates in the past may be more likely to support them in the future 
to maintain consistency in the eyes of the public and potentially hold greater appeal with their 
voter base.  
 
Though exploring these biases and decision rules is insightful, the external structural 
environment of motorcycle associations and regulators may also shed more light on why helmet 
mandates have not been enacted in the U.S. 
Analyzing Structural and Environmental Influences 
The role of the regulators is ultimately to decide on whether to pass a bill or not. However, this 
decision can largely be based upon the organizational power of more special interest groups like 
motorcycle associations. Here, this report will be discussing what motorcycle associations have 
done to increase their political power and strengthen their influence over regulators. 
 
Drawing motivation from their values and objectives, motorcycle associations, from MRF to the 
AMA, are staunchly opposed to helmet mandates. They oppose any attempt for helmet mandates 
to be implemented and work to repeal ones that already were. However, this strength of such 
opposition is not solely the work of their values; it may also be due to their ability to organize 
and take advantage of collective action. One very applicable method for analyzing how they 
have been able to retain such authority in Washington and Senates across the nation is through 
Kotter’s “leading change” framework.  
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“Leading change” is premised on Kotter’s belief that change is not an event, where one situation 
will cascade and lead to another; in fact, change is a process where, each stage builds upon the 
previous one. These stages, as Kotter explains them, are the following:  
1. Establish sense of urgency 
2. Form powerful coalition 
3. Create a vision 
4. Communicate vision 
5. Empower others to act on that vision 
6. Plan and create ST wins 
7. Consolidate improvements and produce more change 
8. Institutionalize new approaches 
 
Through reviewing the history and process of the repeal of federal helmet laws, as well as using 
the first six steps of this framework, it can be determined how the structural and environmental 
changes motorcycle associations were able to implement to strengthen their collective voice in 
opposing helmet mandates. When compounded with the lack of a coalition supporting helmet 
mandates, motorcyclist associations were able to become an extremely strong presence in both 
federal and state governments.  
 
Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
A sense of urgency is imperative to effectively stir the masses into driving change. In the case of 
California following the 1966 Highway Safety Act, this sense of urgency was what spurred 
individual motorcyclists to come out and publically take action against the federal helmet 
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mandate. By 1975, California was still the only state that had not passed a mandatory helmet law 
(Highway Data Loss Institute, 2016). Motorcyclists saw it as the last state standing, the last place 
where they could still make a difference and prevent helmet mandates from passing (Jones & 
Bayer, 2007). Therefore, to the individual motorcyclists, as well as the organizations, protesting 
helmet mandates in California was an obvious decision. Furthermore, because California had the 
most number of registered motorcyclists, as well as the highest number of motorcyclist fatalities 
from accidents, its lack of a helmet law only served to propel this sense of urgency. Urgency was 
thus what allowed motorcyclist organizations to thwart state legislators who had attempted to 
introduce helmet mandates in the state eight separate times between 1968 and 1975. The most 
salient example of this power of urgency was demonstrated in 1973. When a councilman decided 
to propose a mandatory helmet mandate, 100 motorcyclists entered the council’s chambers to 
protest. Hell’s Angels announced that they would bring “at least 500 members” to the day of the 
scheduled vote (as cited in Jones & Bayer, 2007). All this pressure from individuals and 
organizations desperate to keep helmet mandates at bay led to the councilman withdrawing his 
ordinance. 
 
As an aside, the lack of urgency from the general public – with the public generally being 
ambivalent to the implementation of helmet manate law− only served to further strengthen the  
voice of the motorcycle associations.  
 
Forming A Powerful Coalition 
One could argue, however, that the success of the motorcyclist organizations and the 
motorcyclist riders themselves in preventing helmet mandates from passing in California was 
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attributed to the coalition of similarly-interested parties and accorded to the power of collective 
action. Olson (2009) pioneered that effective collection action rests on the size of the group, as 
well as the incentive system in place to ensure members contribute to the group’s efforts. He 
proposed that a special interest organization should be small, but still be able to command the 
authority similar to that of a larger group – in other words, “a federation of federations” (2009). 
The motorcyclist associations made an effort to create this structure when fighting against the 
1991 ISTEA’s penalty clause.  
 
Starting from the late 1900s, numerous small motorcyclist associations and organizations were 
formed across the country due to the benefits attached to being a member. Beyond a voice that 
can fight on your behalf for motorcyclist rights, associations provide members with other perks. 
For instance, the ABATE of Wisconsin provides  members with regular news updates on 
motorcycle-related legislation from the surrounding states, as well as action items for members 
to take if they would like to speak out (Dwyer, 2007). AMA members are eligible for discounts 
on items that may interest motorcyclists, for instance certain types of health insurance11, Hertz, 
etc. (“AMA Member, 2013). Once these small groups are established, the social bonds that are 
built between members only serve to strengthen the small group’s commitment to each other and 
to the association’s mission. However, small groups are at a disadvantage because they do not 
have much power. Prior to when the 1991 ISTEA was passed, the smaller SMROs attempted to 
repeal the ISTEA’s penalty clause, to no avail. Resources were dispersed across associations, 
across multiple issues, resulting in less authority in federal politics. Instead, when multiple small 
                                                     
11 It is uncertain whether some states have been able to enact and enforce health insurance discounts for 
motorcyclists that wear their helmet 
 
Page | 40  
  
associations joined together to create an overarching structural body for themselves, they were 
more effective. 
 
Following the failure to prevent the ISTEA’s penalty clause from passing, in the early 1990s, the 
SMROs began to partner and work closely with other motorcycle associations like NCOM, the 
MRF, and even the AMA. With the combined resources of all these associations, they were able 
to bring more clout to the federal political space. From 1991-1995, the SMROs alone sent more 
and more members every year, eventually in 1995 having 37 state representatives and 
delegations in Washington supporting their cause (Jones & Bayer, 2007). In practical terms, 
coalitions between organizations did not just increase others’ awareness of why one would want 
to oppose helmet mandates. They also increase the amount of finances, time, and energy 
resources devoted to the cuase only made organization of the association even stronger. In early 
1995, the partnership with the AMA was able to fulfill this need. With their financial sources, the 
AMA was able to fund trips for over 50 motorcycle rights activists to DC, and as a result, 
continue to build the presence of the motorcycle associations as a powerful coalition (Curtin, 
2011).  
 
As this coalition of smaller motorcyclist associations grew larger, the coalition was fortunately 
still able to maintain its small-group structure. Each still has separate Boards, yet they all 
maintain in contact through regular face time meetings. Therefore, the MRF Board of Directors 
worked with the NCOM administrators to schedule meetings at the same time so that maximum 
support could just be given to these easily mobilized, tight-knit smaller associations.   
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Creating a Vision 
Having built a coalition, the next stage of Kotter’s framework is to create a vision. These 
associations, though all fighting to have no helmet laws, did not have a defined vision for 
themselves. Specifically for the ISTEA, they held a joint “Meeting of the Minds” – a two hour 
session− where they decided that their vision would be to further their value of maintaining their 
motorcyclists’ freedom of choice (Curtin, 2011). Previously, they had pushed for bifurcated 
purposes, pushing for both a repeal of the penalty portion of the ISTEA as well as as repealing 
the seatbelt mandate. However, they realized during this Meeting that they needed to decide on a 
singular goal, and so agreed to focus on just opposing helmet mandates. Once this vision was 
clarified, the rest of the Meeting was thus devoted to creating a coordinated agenda for how 
things needed to get done. One of their main goals was to repeal the penalty portion of the 
ISTEA by 1995. This gave them a four year window for them to repeal the penalty portion of the 
ISTEA before the states that did not have helmet mandates would be penalized. By redefining 
their goals and creating a vision for themselves, the motorcyclist associations were able to move 
forward and come up with an ultimately very successful, targeted strategy to accomplish these 
goals.  
 
Communicating Vision to Otherss 
With this concrete goal− to repeal the penalty portion of the ISTEA by 1995− in mind, the 
motorcycle associations were on the same page. However, more importantly, in the 1990s, they 
were able to set up an efficient communication system that propagated this mission to the smaller 
mobile organizations. These techniques for diligently managing relationships with other 
motorcycle associations and members also applied to their relationship with regulators.  
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The MRF had always highly valued active communication between their members and their 
congressional delegations. They find it essential to “grass-root movements” such as opposing 
helmet mandates. Communication exists through phone calls, letters, in-person visits, etc. Now, 
having partnered with other motorcycle associations, this transparent communication structure 
has been used in inter-association interactions too. For instance, the MRF publishes a bi-monthly 
newsletter that keeps SMROs updated on current legislative information – as it relates to 
motorcycles. Furthermore, since 1991, there have been expanded regional seminars for members 
from any of the motorcycle associations that allow state officers of SMROs and other chapter 
leaders to talk to the actual motorcycle activists (Curtin, 2011). Because of these efforts, the 
coalition has been able to constantly know which representatives are in support or opposition to a 
helmet bill. In 2008, ABATE Iowa has a complete listing of all the potential representatives 
during the 2008 election that opposed helmet law (ABATE Iowa, 2008). Together, through these 
meetings, they are able to develop legislative mailing lists. This widens the network of the 
motorcycle associations, allowing the cycle to repeat again with each successive representative 
or region. 12 
 
Overall, it seems the main reasons for why motorcycle associations were able to gain such 
political influence lie in their ability to transform change. Specifically, by partnering with 
numerous other associations and create a coalition of collective action, they were able to redefine 
their goals and strategy in order to build strong relationships with each other and with the 
regulators.  
 
 
                                                     
12 http://mrf.org/library2/index.php/mrf-white-papers/white-vol4/repeal-of-federal-helmet-law-/ 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING HELMET MANDATES 
 
Based on this exploration, the two main recommendations for regulators trying to pass helmet 
mandates are: (1) to continue increasing education among both regulators and motorcycle 
associations− and even the individual motorcyclists as well− and if that does not work, (2) to use 
choice architecture to create alternative methods for encouraging motorcyclists to wear helmets.  
 
Educating Motorcyclists 
First, educating motorcycle associations about the scientific evidence behind wearing helmets, 
there would need to be a greater focus on the ramifications of motorcycle accidents to the rest of 
society, not just solely an individual burden. Regulators should speak and emphasize to the 
associations the differences in their values However, because the intrinsic values of the 
motorcycle members and associations are so strong, it may be more worthwhile to target 
education towards the motorcyclist association members.  
 
Therefore, second, to increase education amongst motorcycle association members, it is 
important to specifically address the optimism bias of these individuals. Like discussed before, 
one reason why motorcyclist association members may believe that serious and fatal injuries will 
not happen to them is simply their lack of knowledge on the topic. As mentioned previously, if 
motorcyclists have not personally experienced an accident, known of close friends and family 
that were involved in accidents, or heard anything about motorcyclist accidents on the news, it is 
likely that motorcyclists would perceive the risk of an accident to be much lower than it actually 
is. They may not fully understand the ramifications of an accident of such severity. To combat 
this perception, the newest riders, who are at the time the most impressionable, should be 
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targeted with education. Information including the most current rate of death from motorcycle 
accidents, and the effectiveness of helmets in reducing this risk, would be included in education 
materials for new riders studying for their motorcycle operating license exams. These should be 
framed using stretched time horizons, where the rates and number of deaths should be stretched 
across longer periods of time. For instance, stating the probability of  registered motorcyclist 
getting into an accident over the lifetime of that motorcyclist’s riding career, rather than focusing 
on a year-to-year statistic. Because the probabilities are higher for longer time horizons, 
motorcyclists are likely to take greater stock and internalize the impacts of not wearing a helmet 
than if the probabilities are presented over a shorter one.  
 
This education should not engender much opposition from motorcyclist association. As much as 
they oppose helmet mandates, this is not because they believe that helmets are ineffective. They 
in fact acknowledge that helmets are effective forms of protective gear that can reduce a 
motorcyclist’s chance of being injured. Their opposition stems solely from their interest in 
maintaining motorcyclists’ freedom of choice. The purpose with education would be to ensure 
that the motorcyclists make the right choice, to wear a helmet when riding. A question on why 
helmets should be worn while riding should be sked in each exam. This could potentially change 
a new motorcyclist’s perception of how risky it is to ride a motorcycle and reinforce the 
importance of helmets to a motorcyclist’s safety.  
 
During the training or exam itself, a video of a now disabled motorcycle accident survivor 
speaking about his experience, or anecdotes from family members of a motorcyclist killed in a 
motorcycle accident should be shown. The video would be a particularly salient example 
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showing why helmets should be worn. Focusing on the victim and employing the identifiable 
victim bias− which theorizes that personal stories are more impactful than statistics− would 
make motorcyclists more inclined to absorb and better understand the safety risks when a helmet 
is not worn, eroding the perception of “won’t happen to me.” Hence, they would be more likely 
to wear helmets of their own volition− even in states not requiring helmets. 
 
However, realistically, increased education would not be enough. Although improved education 
has the opportunity to change one’s values and objectives, and potential biases, the external 
collective action of motorcyclist associations is much more influential and powerful. Because of 
the structure of how bills are written and the existence of lobby, the already concentrated power 
of these motorcycle associations is very difficult to weaken and combat.  
Alternatives to Helmet Mandates – Using Choice Architecture 
Rather than attempting to push mandates through, there are alternate methods for encouraging 
motorcyclists to wear helmets. Previously this report discussed the biases and decision rules of 
regulators and motorcycle associations. Because they are sometimes so closely tied to intuitive 
thinking, it is probably that even with increased education, both parties may still not be inclined 
to pass motorcycle helmet mandates. Therefore, instead, choice architecture can be implemented 
on the regulator end to circumvent these biases and decision rules. These solutions would thus 
satisfy the interests and objectives of both the regulators and the motorcycle associations. The 
ultimate goal is to encourage motorcyclists to wear helmets in a way where it does not feel like 
their core value− of having the freedom of choice− is being suppressed. 
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To encourage helmet-wearing amongst motorcyclist, it is important to address the main biases 
and beliefs of the riders: thinking that accidents “won’t happen to me” and wanting to maintain 
individual freedom of choice. Regulation specifically works counter to the latter, with laws being 
seen by some as the epitome of control and a lack of choice. Therefore, instead of state 
regulation− which has more often than not been repealed− or the federal government passively 
forcing every U.S. state to adopt these laws, there are other ways to encourage motorcyclists to 
wear helmets. Many are drawn from similar strategies used to popularize the seatbelt use in 
automobiles. 
 
Creating Checklists 
In addition to education for new motorcyclists, a decision aid, such as a checklist, could be used 
to help develop a helmet-wearing habit. Checklists are a useful tool to incorporate deliberate 
thinking into otherwise intuitive decision processes (Gawande, 2010). In the case of wearing 
helmets, the checklist is a useful tool for forcing motorcyclists to use their deliberative thinking 
when deciding whether to wear a helmet or not. By steering the brain away from intuitive 
thinking, the hope is that because of increased education, motorcyclists would be more likely to 
wear helmets. This checklist would outline actions that riders should take every time they ride a 
motorcycle, would be drafted by regulators and included in education materials used for the 
permit tests. Over time, if the motorcyclists follow the checklist, the wearing of helmets, among 
other items listed on the checklist, will become almost second-nature, similar to how seatbelts 
are now a habit for most American adults riding in an automobile. 
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Public-Private Partnerships with Manufacturers 
Despite the importance of education and decision aids, there will still be motorcyclists who 
simply do not care for wearing helmets. Faced with this obstinacy, a feasible alternative solution 
would be for regulators to partner with private companies and together implement choice 
architecture. Choice architecture is used when regulators recognize the difficulty of interfering 
with people’s natural decision-making process, and as a result, redesigning the environment to 
nudge riders into choosing the desired action− here, wearing helmets. These environments do not 
bombard riders with information on helmet safety, but are much more nuanced and subtle. By 
creating these new environments, more motorcyclists will, on their own volition, decide to wear 
helmets, and because they feel like they made their own choice, they are more likely to continue 
wearing helmets.  
 
One method would be to partner with motorcycle manufacturers. Currently, the two largest 
motorcycle manufacturers, Harley Davidson and Honda, support the wearing of helmets. On 
Harley Davidson’s website, under an obscure link called “We Care About You,” they explicitly 
say to “always wear a helmet… and insist your passengers do too” (Harley-Davidson, 2014). 
And yet, it is ironic that on the same page, Harley Davidson encourages motorcyclists to join the 
AMA− which as explained prior, is against helmet mandates that, as described earlier, increase 
helmet use. Meanwhile, Honda Powersports does a better job of promoting helmet use. A page 
on its website, under Honda Services, is dedicated to safe riding and has a pre-ride checklist. On 
this checklist, a statement says “Your helmet is by far the most important piece of protective gear 
for safe riding. Period” (Honda Powersports, n.d.). Beyond this page, there is a vague nod to 
helmets under the “Learn to Ride” section of the website, under “Get Gear” (Honda Powersports, 
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2013). Because they support wearing helmets, it is not surprising that these motorcycle 
manufacturers also manufacture and sell their own motorcycle helmets. However, there is much 
more that can be done. Both Harley Davidson and Honda are well-loved brands. Motorcyclists 
exhibit brand loyalty and a certain relationship with their motorcycle dealers. Therefore, these 
manufacturers are in the unique position of being able to influence their customers. Since 
helmets are a huge part of protecting their customers, the riders, they should take on a more 
proactive approach in advocating for helmet-wearing. This will also have the added financial 
benefit of increasing helmet sales.  
 
In terms of physical changes to the motorcycle, riders may be induced to wear helmets if there 
are warning lights on the motorcycle or reminder stickers. Warning lights, similar to those 
mandated in U.S.-sold automobiles when a front-seated person is not wearing a seatbelt, are 
naturally seen as an annoyance. Thus, motorcyclists would be inclined to behave in ways that 
will turn it off. A warning light on the motorcycle would either be programmed to turn on for a 
number of seconds when the ignition is started, or if added with a sensor, would only turn off if it 
senses a helmet on the rider’s head. Though the former may be effective for the first few weeks 
and easier to implement, after a while, riders may learn to mentally block out the warning sound, 
as it activates whether a rider wears a helmet or not. Even the psychological wiring of our brain 
to heed warnings can be rewired. For instance, when fire alarms go off in classrooms or 
apartment buildings, there are many students and residents who don’t leave, thinking that it is 
just another fire drill. Therefore, the latter would be much more effective.  
 
 
Page | 49  
  
Another option would be to have reminder stickers on all motorcycles. They would detail the 
effectiveness of motorcycle helmets in preventing head and neck injuries, and would be another 
way to reinforce the importance of helmets. Every time riders clamber upon their motorcycles, 
they would be reminded to wear a helmet. If individuals do not want the sticker marring their 
motorcycles, they would have to actively remove it. Even in this situation, they would’ve at least 
seen and acknowledged the sticker. Both methods make it more difficult for riders to ignore 
important helmet safety information.  
 
Instead of physical changes, there can also be marketing changes. Currently, motorcycles and 
motorcycle helmets are sold separately. Having just spent a couple thousand on a motorcycle, 
buyers are not inclined to purchase something else, even if it is a comparably less expensive 
$100-$600 motorcycle helmet. According to loss aversion theory and the property of diminishing 
marginal utility (or disutility), having two separate losses makes an individual feel worse than 
having one large loss. Therefore, bundling them together would not make the purchasers feel as 
“bad” as purchasing the motorcycle and helmet separately. The manufacturers themselves would 
not even need to set a discount for the bundle. An additional $100 tacked onto the end of an 
already sizeable investment does not significantly change a purchasers’ decision to buy the 
motorcycle (bundle) or not.  Essentially by bundling, a helmet would not be treated as 
purchasing something “extra.” 13 
 
If discounts are a feasible option, and the government is able to subsidize the agreed upon 
difference, manufacturers could give motorcyclists who have purchased a helmet discounts on 
                                                     
13 This is also related to the concept of mental accounting, when combining losses is more attractive than looking at 
each one separately.  
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other riding accessories, like other protective gear, or oils and chemicals. There could also be 
discounts for purchasing a second helmet. Any of these options would be appealing for an avid 
rider, but would also be great gifts for motorcyclists that are part of motorcycling communities 
and associations, for instance the AMA. With more people purchasing safety equipment, 
including helmets, peer pressure and herding will come into play, influencing even more 
motorcyclists to wear helmets. Helmets could become the next “cool” trend. Not only would this 
drive financial revenues for the motorcycle manufacturers (and continue to build brand loyalty), 
such an intervention would likely be much cheaper for the government than implementing 
additional enforcement for a universal helmet mandate, or giving states supplementary highway 
transportation funding.  
 
Public-Private Partnerships with Insurance Companies 
In addition to partnering with manufacturers, government regulators can also partner with health 
insurance and motorcycle insurance companies. Insurance companies remain profitable by 
increasing their premiums for more high-risk individuals. This concept can be applied for 
motorcyclists as well. First, the government could launch a campaign on national highways 
encouraging motorcycle riders to wear helmets. It would be similar to the “Click It or Ticket” 
(CIOT) campaign that takes place annually over the Memorial Day Weekend to remind riders 
and passengers to wear seatbelts. According to the NHTSA, the CIOT campaign is the most 
successful seat belt enforcement campaign ever to increase the national seat belt usage rate 
(NHTSA, 2014).   
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A helmet-wearing version of this campaign could include putting up billboards and electronic 
signs on highways with short facts or messages explaining the importance of wearing helmets− 
such as how much more frequent motorcycle accidents occur compared to automobiles, or how 
many lives could be saved in a year if all motorcycle riders wore helmets. There could also be 
messages with facts on how much more the average taxpayer pays every year in taxes in hospital 
costs, due to unhelmeted motorcyclists taking up hospital funds for severe injuries that could 
have been prevented if they had worn helmets. This would not only shame motorcyclists into 
wearing helmets, but would rouse the otherwise indifferent public into “forcing” motorcyclists 
(through peer pressure) to wear helmets when they ride. No one wants to pay additional taxes for 
someone else’s recklessness. 
 
In conjunction to this campaign, insurance companies can claim that they will only pay for 
medical expenses of motorcyclists, or even increase the payout for motorcyclists involved in 
accidents if they were wearing proper DOT-certified helmets. Because non-certified helmets 
have limited effectiveness in preventing serious injury, it is imperative that the certified vs. non-
certified distinction is made. One way to implement this would be to reduce the premiums or 
limit the coverage for motorcyclists that can prove that they wear certified helmets on the road. 
Thus, either way, motorcyclists who do not wear certified helmets would be sent a clear message 
that riders by all means have the freedom of choice, to engage in whatever risky behaviour they 
would like, as long as they understand it is at their own financial risk. When implementing this 
scheme, insurance companies should emphasize that purchasing a helmet now is much cheaper 
than paying for potentially astronomic hospital bills in the future. Since riders often think of 
themselves as “invincible” speaking in comparable monetary terms may be more effective than 
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just elusively talking about death. If a public-private partnership with manufacturers regarding 
discounts is implemented, there is even more reason for riders to wear a helmet: not only would 
riders receive a lower premium for their health insurance, but would also receive discounts after 
purchasing a helmet.  
 
Overall, extending some creativity into the policy-making process and framing it in terms of the 
biases associated with irrational behaviour, more motorcyclists will wear helmets while riding. 
Only after this willingness to wear helmets is nurtured would later universal helmet mandates 
will be less threatening to motorcyclist associations and riders themselves, and thus receive their 
stamp of approval. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, this report found that though there is sound scientific evidence supporting the 
enactment of motorcycle helmet mandates, there are several reasons that motorcycle helmet law 
has not been passed across the U.S. First, though regulators are charged with protecting the 
interests of the public, they often succumb to more personal values of consistency, which in turn 
can lead to them adhering to the objective of catering to special interest groups, like motorcycle 
associations, rather than that of the general public. This behaviour is compounded by the 
motorcyclist association’s strong interest to maintain their riders’ freedom of choice. 
Furthermore, the specific biases of the regulators and motorcycle associations prime them to 
react intuitively, making quick decisions to support or oppose helmet law without much 
deliberative thought or consideration.  
 
Second, the internal motivations driving motorcyclist associations to oppose universal helmet 
law spurred them into organizing themselves and strengthening their collective bargaining power. 
Specifically, the Kotter framework describes that the associations were extremely effective at 
forming powerful coalitions, creating a vision− to repeal the penalty portion of the 1991 ISTEA− 
and maintaining strong communication with their members and various regulators. As a result, 
proposals to pass a helmet mandate, either at the federal or the state level, are prone to not being 
passed.  
 
Though education on the importance of wearing motorcycle helmets is still valuable, to take a 
concrete step towards having motorcyclists wear helmets, regulators should resort to other 
measures. Since at this point, after over twenty years of organized collective action, it is very 
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difficult to weaken the motorcycle association lobbyists and influence, the alternative would be 
to implement choice architecture. This choice architecture would aim to influence motorcyclists 
to wear helmets of their own volition− maintaining their freedom of choice while regulators 
continue to protect the safety of the greater public. Specifically, regulators should form public-
private partnerships with manufacturers and insurance companies.  
 
Over time, as more motorcyclists are nudged towards and become used to wearing helmets, their 
attitudes will indirectly change the underlying values and objectives of motorcycle associations, 
potentially weakening them and allowing regulators to finally pass the lasting federal helmet 
mandate that the U.S. needs.  
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